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The perceived collective continuity (PCC) of a national identity serves as a crucial source
of stability and self-esteem for group members. Recent work has explored the
consequences of perceived continuity when the meaning of a nation’s past is seen in a
negative light, and the challenges this brings for the negotiation of a positive identity in the
present, signalling the potential value of perceived discontinuity The current paper
extends this literature by examining the role of intergroup relations in the construction of
both collective continuities and discontinuities. Through analysing the discursive
management of national identity in nine focus groups in a post-conflict context (Serbia,
N = 67), we reveal how the tensions between continuity and discontinuity are embedded
within a broader discussion of the nation’s relationship with relevant national outgroups
across its history. The findings contribute to theoretical knowledge on the interlinking of
national identity and PCCby illustrating the ways in which intergroup relations of the past
shape the extent to which continuity is seen as desirable or undesirable. We argue that
despite the psychological merits of collective continuity, discontinuity can become
attractive and useful when there is limited space to challenge how a nation’s history is
remembered and the valence given to the past. The paper concludes by offering an
account of how social and political contexts can influence the nature, functions, and
valence of PCC within national identities.
A key challenge for identity scholars has been to understand how individuals and groups
address the paradox of sameness within change: the human ability to experience
individual and collective aspects of the self as remaining continuous over time, while
simultaneously acknowledging the inevitability of change (Chandler, 2000; Chandler &
Proulx, 2008). The challenges this paradox presents for collective identity are brought to
the fore when nations go through periods of political transformation as those promoting
change face the task of aligning it with a continuous narrative of group identity.
Frequently, this is done by drawing on references to history as a source of legitimacy
(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).
Literature outside of psychology has shown how the historical dimension of national
groups can support their claims to authenticity and constructs the nation as an imagined
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community (Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawm& Ranger, 1983). Social psychological research
on national identity has extended this work by showing how perceived historical
continuity is associated with perceptions of the group as ‘real’ and entitative (Haslam,
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000) and heightens levels of identification with it (Sani et al., 2007).
Much of this work contends that continuities are beneficial for the psychology of in-group
members, while discontinuities are problematic (Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Sani, 2005).
Because of this, relatively little attention has been paid to the strategic function of group
discontinuity.
We seek to remedy this by analysing the role of both continuity and discontinuity in in-
groupmembers’ discursive constructions of national identity in thewakeof socio-political
change. We argue that discontinuities, such as continuities, are constructed with a
purpose. In analysing them as such, we seek to illustrate that discontinuities play an
important role in the construction of national identities.While illuminating the functional
role of discontinuities, we also aim to show how relevant ‘others’ become integral to the
creation of a consistent group narrative by allowing group members to differentiate
between what is perceived to be ‘our’ history and what is ‘imposed’ on us by outsiders
(Holy, 1996; Tileaga, 2009).
Historical continuity and national identity
Despite temporality being evident in the initial conceptualization of social identity and
social relations as continuously developing processes (e.g., Tajfel, 1974), much of the
early social identity research involved a horizontal and static version of the collective,
‘bracket(ing) the historical dimension of social life’ (Condor, 1996, p. 302). To tackle this,
Sani et al. (2007) developed a framework to capture ‘Perceived Collective Continuity’
(PCC), broadening the analysis of social identity to include a group’s past and future. PCC
conceptualizes the extent to which social groups are viewed as stable and continuous
over time, and research has shown how it links with group identification, entitativity,
esteem, social well-being, and existential security for in-group members (Sani, Bowe, &
Herrera, 2008; Sani et al., 2007; Sani, Herrera, & Bowe, 2009; Smeekes & Verkuyten,
2015).
Perceived collective continuity encompasses two sub-dimensions: perceived
cultural continuity and perceived historical continuity. Perceived cultural continuity
is achieved through an emphasis on the stability of an in-group’s core features (i.e.,
values, norms, and cultural markers) that define a group’s ‘essence’, while perceived
historical continuity is achieved through perceptions of interlinking historical events
that create a consistent narrative. This distinction becomes useful to consider in
contexts of change. As Sani et al. (2007, p. 1121) argue, ‘groups that have
undergone dramatic and radical social and political transformations may find it hard,
or even undesirable, to claim high degrees of cultural continuity, while they may
wish to stress historical continuity in order to enhance the intelligibility of the group
narrative and to make sense of the changes that have taken place.’ This active
dimension of ‘stressing’ continuity illustrates that PCC can be strategically
constructed by in-group members. Yet, less has been done to examine collective
continuity as a socially negotiated process, and empirical explorations of the
construct itself are largely quantitative and experimental (e.g., Roth, Huber, Juenger,
& Liu, 2017; Sani et al., 2007; Smeekes, McKeown, & Psaltis, 2017).
Existing accounts of how group identity is constructed in relation to history are most
clearly articulated within discursive psychology (Condor, 2006; Gibson, 2012;
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Greenwood, 2015; Kirkwood, 2019; Tileaga, 2009). Following Billig’s (1995) seminal
work on banal nationalism, rhetorical approaches have provided insight into the strategic
use of history in talk on nationhood, identity, and the politics around it. This literature
reveals the power and contested nature of discourses on history and identity, as these
reproduce a way of life, legitimize political changes, and mobilize towards collective
action (Gibson, 2012; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).
As times of changemake the drive for a coherent groupnarrative all themore necessary
(Chandler & Proulx, 2008), a focus on how historical continuity is managed in talk on
political change can reveal the strategic use of continuity for themanagement of a positive
identity (Greenwood, 2015). It also has the power to reveal when the use of narratives of
continuity becomes constrained. Thus, a deeper exploration of how continuity is socially
negotiated affords an opportunity to advance theoretical insights on the relationship
between collective continuity and identity.
The limits of historical continuity
The successful construction of a nation’s history as continuous over time requires both
selective remembering and forgetting. As such, the positive effects of continuity for group
identity depend on the ability to remember the past in a certain way (Roth et al., 2017;
Topcu & Hirst, 2019; Warner, Kent, & Kiddoo, 2016). While previous research has found
that discontinuity can be experienced as threatening and lead to group schisms (Sani,
2005; Smeekes et al., 2017), in their experimental study on historical representations and
German identity, Roth et al. (2017) found that perceived historical continuity only
alleviated identity threat for individualswhen the group’s past behaviourwaspresented as
positive. In contrast, when the past was portrayed negatively, continuity became more
threatening to group identity.
In acknowledging the role of valence for whether continuity has a positive or negative
impact on identity, wemust also acknowledge that this valence is not defined in isolation
from relevant others. National histories are typically embedded in international contexts,
and those who hold the power to shape how events are remembered can also shape how
we position ourselves in relation to the past (see also Figueiredo, Martinovic, Rees, &
Licata, 2017). For example, in a study on representations of world history in 12 countries,
participants rated Eurocentric events asmore important than ethnocentric events, even in
non-European countries (Liu et al., 2005). Illustrating the importance of intergrouppower
relations in shaping what history is deemed important to remember both nationally and
internationally, these findings have implications for the extent towhich a nation’s version
of its past, embeddedwithin a transnational context, can be seen as legitimate if it deviates
significantly frommore dominant versions ofworld history. Thus, it becomes necessary to
appreciate how PCC depends on how the meaning of the past is perceived by both self
and other. It matters not only what ‘we’ think, but also what relevant others think
(Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011). Consequently, there are limits to when historical
continuity becomes desirable for groups. Therefore, in examining historical continuity as
a socially negotiated process we must also consider how it is shaped by the broader
intergroup context.
While the relationship between historical continuity and collective identity can
become constrained by intergroup relations, paradoxically, the reverse is also true.
Intergroup relations can become constrained when individuals perceive continuity
between history and identity. For example, Warner et al. (2016) found that perceiving an
outgroup as a past enemy and as continuous over time led to more negative outgroup
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attitudes in the present than if the outgroup was perceived as a past ally and continuous
over time. This aligns with Sani et al.’s (2007) argument that perceived historical
continuity becomes important in times of change, to enhance the intelligibility of the
group narrative, and by extension here, the role of others within it. However, it also hints
at a possible benefit of historical discontinuity: the potential for groups to reconstruct
their relationships and identities in the present bymoving towards a discontinuitywith an
undesirable past.
On the potential of historical discontinuity
Discontinuities tend to be perceived in national identity literature as negative disruptions
to the linear flow of history (Runia, 2014). Yet, like continuities, discontinuities can be
constructed by in-groups, and they are often done so strategically.
Discontinuities can function to mark the ‘end’ to a particular history and the potential
beginning of another (Zerubavel, 1993). This is evident in how we talk about historical
transitions, labelling societies as ‘post-communist’ or ‘post-socialist’, indicating a break in
historical time (Holy, 1996; Ristic, 2007; Tileaga, 2009). In contexts where the past is
stigmatizing, discontinuities can facilitate a fresh start for groups to renegotiate a positive
collective identity. However, given the links between entitativity, essentialism, and
perceived continuity (Haslam et al., 2000; Sani et al., 2007), discontinuities can also be
experienced as problematic as they threaten the ability to reproduce the ‘essential’
characteristics that make a nation and its identity unique (Reicher, 2008). One way of
alleviating this threat is by shifting the perspective on the cause of perceived
discontinuities. Group members can do so by using discontinuities to differentiate ‘our’
history from that imposed by an ‘other’ (Holy, 1996). For example, in talk on historical
transitions, metaphors of ruptures serve the purpose of justifying what could have been,
had the nation not been interfered with, or hindered, by relevant others (Holy, 1996, p.
120). As such, discontinuities are often attributed to the actions of foreign others who
have forced their beliefs and politics onto us. In post-communist Romania, the ‘Othering’
of communism in official reports accomplished the task of distancing a positive nation
from a stigmatizing past by constructing communism as an ideology imposed on the
nation by external actors (the Soviet Union; Tileaga, 2009).
In the distinctions made between continuity and discontinuity, we see different
versions of the nation emerge in relation to its history. In the former, the nation is seen as a
subject of history, acting in agentic ways that reproduce an ‘essence’. In the latter, the
nation is seen as an object of history, being acted on by others, to the detriment of the
group’s identity (Holy, 1996, Chapter 4). In using discontinuity arguments then, history
becomes aboutwhatwas done ‘to us’ rather thanwhatwas done ‘by us’. By extending our
focus to discontinuities, we are able to more thoroughly examine the role of intergroup
relations for the construction of national identity. To do this, we ask:How do citizens, in
contexts of socio-political change, strategically use historical continuities and discon-
tinuities, and what purpose do these serve in the discursive construction of national
identity?
In answering this question, we address two interrelated aims: (1) to examine how
group members construct and manage national identity in times of socio-political change
using historical continuities and discontinuities; and (2) to examine whether, and how,
intergroup relations are drawn upon and utilized in arguments of collective continuity or
discontinuity. In examining both processes, we bring attention to the strategic function
and socially negotiated nature of collective continuity.
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Research context
The present study draws on qualitative data collected in Serbia. The choice to explore the
construction of continuity and discontinuity in the context of Serbia is informed by a
number of recent socio-political changes unique to the context. Firstly, Serbian history is
marked by group narratives emphasizing the nation’s identity as defined by being ‘in-
between’ two worlds: between east and west, between Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
Empires, and between western level-headedness and eastern irrationality (Russell-
Omaljev, 2016, p. 1). This characteristic is captured in the metaphor of Serbia as a bridge
between civilizations and ideological systems, emerging with a ‘split identity’ and divided
society (Ristic, 2007). In the past 30 years, Serbia has transitioned from being part of a
supranational communist union (Yugoslavia), to engaging in civil wars, experiencing the
redrawing of national borders, and finally becoming its own nation state aimed at
achieving EU membership.
However, public ambivalence towards EU integration persists and is rooted in
concerns that political change threatens socio-cultural markers of the nation and its
history (Ristic, 2007). Prospective EUmembership places intergroup relations at the heart
of political change, as integration entails a revision of existing political allegiances, and in
the case of Serbia, a move towards a ‘Western’ future. Integration into a supranational
union defined bywestern values signals a potential end to ‘being in-between’ twoworlds,
a characteristic feature of Serbian nationhood. Thus, the transition from ‘post’-socialist
(and ‘post’-conflict) society to prospective EU member makes Serbia an ideal context to
explore how citizens try to reconcile real-world socio-political change with collective
continuity of national identity. Bearing this in mind, we ask: How do citizens in
contemporary Serbia strategically use historical continuities and discontinuities, and
what purpose do these serve in the discursive construction of their national identity?
Method
Design
Following discursive psychology and research on national identity (Reicher & Hopkins,
2001), we acknowledge that the meaning, boundaries, and nature of group identities are
contested and have powerful consequences forwho is included, and how they should act.
Our focus on examining the discursive functions of continuities and discontinuities for
national identity led us to approach the questionwith a qualitative design, so as not to limit
the imposition of fixed representations of the past (as previous research has tended to do),
but to instead examine how these are elicited in dialogue (Wilkinson, 1998). In order to
fully capture the ‘social’ dynamics of the discursive, focus groups were chosen for data
collection as they allow for a research context that elicits data from interactions,
encouraging ‘sharing and comparing’ within the group and providing insight into both
what participants think, and why (Morgan, 2012).
Participants and procedure
A total of nine focus groupswere conducted in Serbia between 2015 and 2016 (N = 67, 27
females and 40 males) in seven different cities1. Participants were recruited through
purposive sampling, targeting individuals living in selected cities via networks and social
1 Belgrade, Cacak, Nis, Novi Sad, Paracin, Surdulica and Vranje.
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media advertisements. Participants ranged in age from18 to 57 years (M = 34 years)with
occupations ranging from full-time study to employment in the public and private sectors.
Each focus group followed the same topic guide, with six questions covering themes of
Serbias of domestic and foreign politics, as well as history. For example, participants were
asked about their opinion on Serbia joining the EU and what changes they anticipated for
the future.
Each focus group lasted between 21 and 77 min (M = 61 min) and the audio-
recordings were transcribed and analysed in Serbian by the first author, with illustrative
quotes translated for the purpose of presentation.
Analytic procedure
The research aims required taking a functional approach to language in context.
Following others (e.g., Greenwood, 2015), we consider continuity as something that is
constructed through talk,with the purpose of legitimizing certain identity projects.While
previous work on national identity in social psychology has favoured a discursive
psychological approach, we chose to draw on a particular strand of critical discourse
analysis (CDA) as it allowed us to pay particular attention to how the relationship between
language and power is expressed and legitimized in discourse. As our focus is on how
intergroup (power) relations shape discourses on history and identity, our analysis
required placing history at the centre of the framework. As such, the particular strand of
CDA chosen was the discourse-historical approach (DHA; De Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak,
1999; Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 2009).
The DHA emphasizes triangulation through the inclusion of different levels of context
within which a text is embedded, from the immediate situation in which talk occurs, to
the broader historical context which shapes discursive practices. Analytically, the DHA
distinguishes between three interrelated levels: (1) identification of contents/topics; (2)
analysis of macro-discourse strategies; and (3) micro-linguistic means of realization (e.g.,
the use of metaphor, parallelism, and normative language; De Cillia et al., 1999, p. 157).
Thesewere applied to the data in the followingmanner: Firstly, the content of the datawas
examined (level 1 of analysis). Taking into account the aims, coding focused on selecting
all datawhere (1) the in-group (Serbia, social groups), (2) outgroups (the EU, Russia), and/
or (3) historical events (i.e., WWII) were mentioned. Often, these overlapped. Once
defined, this smaller corpuswas analysed to identify the different discursive strategies and
to examine the functions they served in constructing historical continuity or discontinuity
with thepresent (level 2). There are four commonmacro-strategies employed indiscourse
on national identity that function as discursive plans of action (see Table 1 and De Cillia,
1999).
For each strategy analysed, the means of realization were then examined (level 3),
identifying the specific micro-level linguistic tools used to support the arguments made
and the conclusions warranted for whether socio-political change was perceived as
positive or negative. For an example of the interlinking levels of analysis, see Table 2
below.
Analysis
Our analysis addresses the aims of the study in the following ways. In response to our first
aim, we analyse how participants use both historical continuity and discontinuity
arguments to negotiate national identity in response to socio-political change in the
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present. As the first sectionwill show, participants acknowledge the differences between
the past and present, and while appeals to continuity become desirable, in changing
circumstances these become more difficult to sustain, opening up a space for historical
discontinuities to play a positive function for national identity. Next, in line with our
second aim we examine how intergroup relations within the international context are
articulated and used in the construction of national identity continuity and discontinuity.
As the second section will show, intergroup relations are drawn on to either legitimize or
delegitimize politics in thepresent,where continuity arguments focus onusing thepast to
explain the present, while discontinuity arguments are used to argue for the potential
benefits it might bring for the future.
Managing continuity and discontinuity in times of change
Not all change is perceived as a threat to collective continuity (Chandler, 2000). Change
can be seen as a natural way to enhance a group’s identity, ensuring progress and
development in the future (Greenwood, 2015; Roth et al., 2017). Therefore, EU
integration and the political change it brings should not be assumed to be problematic,
and indeed, it was not discussed as such by some participants (e.g., Ana’s position below).
However, the political commitment towards EUmembership brought themanagement of
Serbia’s ‘in-betweenness’ – its historical position as balancing eastern and western
influences – to the forefront (e.g., Russell-Omaljev, 2016). This led to discussions of the
differences between the past and the present, and the country’s ability to sustain its
unique ‘in-between’ identity in the future:
Extract 1. Belgrade (2)
1 Ana: We’re in Europe, it’s completely normal that we become [part of the EU].
2 Marko:Absolutely, geographically yes, andwe shouldn’t runaway from that, but
we
3 should be bold, and the way that Tito2 knew how to balance [politics],
4 that’ll never happen again.
5 Lara: I agree, but back then you had a significantly bigger state, it wasn’t just
6 Serbia, and he was able to keep up the balancing act because Yugoslavia was a
7 significant factor in the Balkans, in Southern Europe, and now we’re nothing.
Table 1. Macro-level discourse strategies of the discourse-historical approach
Macro-discourse strategy Purpose
Constructive strategies Aimed at constructing national identity in a certain way
Perpetuation/justification
strategies
Aimed at reproducing or justifying a threatened identity and status quo
Transformative strategies Aimed at transforming the meaning of a well-established identity and
the status quo
Destructive/ dismantling
strategies
Aimed at dismantling parts of an identity and the status quo without
providing alternatives
2 Former President of the Social Federalist Republic of Yugoslavia, 1953–1980.
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In this exchange, Ana draws on spatial references (line 1) to strategically construct EU
membership as natural, by appealing to geographical unity that has remained constant.
This is challenged by bothMarko and Larawho respondwith ‘yes but’ arguments (ll. 2, 5),
indicating partial agreement followed by disagreement (Pomerantz, 1984). Both Marko
and Lara draw on transformative strategies to differentiate the past from the present (ll.4,
‘that’ll never happen again’; ‘ll.5, ‘back then’, ll.6, ‘nowwe’re nothing’) and to emphasize
a change to the status of the in-group.While forMarko this change in status is used to argue
for a need to regain it (ll. 3), for Lara it functions to argue for historical discontinuity. By
evoking a change to the context and power of Serbia (l.5–7), Lara draws on discontinuity
to justify the lack of political progress in the present as caused by the absence of strong
leadership. This was evident in other discussions as well (see Table 2; Quote 3) where
participants used transformative arguments of discontinuity to acknowledge a lack of
control over change and the group’s future,where power affords nations the agency to be
a subject of history and of its present:
Extract 2. Belgrade (1)
1 Nenad: I think the killer here is that every 10 years our elite changes, and our
value
2 systems [change] [. . .].
3 Bodgan: Let’s compare us to the English. England traces its roots back to the
middle
4 ages, and all that has remained, has stayed continuous, without occupation of
over
5 500 years. Here, you were annihilated for 500 years, and your state was only
6 created in the 19th century. In the 19th century, we were compared to Europe,
7 set back, even if we might have been ahead of them in the past, if we look at
history.
8 We’re lagging behind a whole century, with regards to everything,
9 and our national consciousness is endangered.
As in previous work (Holy, 1996), arguments of historical discontinuity are
strategically used to defend the nation’s lack of progress, and attribute blame for its
current political situation to others. Drawing on comparisons with other nations
participants successfully construct a narrative of Serbian history as defined by ruptures,
where the value ascribed to the stable continuity of other nations affords them legitimacy
and power on an international stage (ll. 3–9). Historical continuity is constructed as an
achievement of a nation able to be in control of its history (l. 3–4), in contrast to Serbia
whose history is defined by the actions of others (l. 5). It is important to note two things
here: (1) that these others are located both outside of the nation (Ottoman occupation)
and within the group (via its leaders/politicians) indicating a divide between those in
power and the Serbian people, and (2) that the need to explain lack of progress stems from
a general consensus in the group(s) that EU membership confers legitimacy to the
progressive nature of a nation.
Yet, the stigma of lack of progress is countered by opening up a ‘what if’ argument
towards the end, where the mention of being ‘ahead’ of other nations in the past allows
participants to represent where Serbia could have been today, had it not been interfered
with by foreign powers, and also to draw a sense of legitimacy via a continuity with the
deeper history of the Serbian nation. Historical discontinuities then, in removing in-group
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agency by constructing the nation as an object of history, end up threatening the cultural
continuity of the group by limiting its ability to progress. This is voiced more extremely
below:
Extract 3. Nis
1 Luka: For 10 yearswe’ve been living in transition,we are aware that everything
2 they’re [EU] requiring is clear manipulation. [. . ..]
3 Are you aware that 80% of the people don’t know the words to the anthem?
4 Are you aware that 90% of people don’t know the order of the colours on the flag?
5 What territory are we even talking about? When nothing is certain anymore,
6 where you lived in four countries without even crossing the street.
7 And that’s all consciously done so that you’ll lose your identity and lose sense for
8 everything around you. And that you’ll become indifferent to whether
9 tomorrow this place is called Bangladesh or Serbia.
Luka draws on suggestive rhetorical questions (ll. 3–5) to construct political
transformation over time as negative for national identity (see Wodak et al., 2009, p.
40). Ongoing political change, imposed from the outside, is portrayed as destabilizing and
evokes a sense of collective angst (cf. Jetten & Wohl, 2012). As in other discussions,
political change is constructed as problematic when it is perceived as enforced by foreign
actors, threatening cultural continuity, evident in references to the preservation of the
symbols of banal nationalism (ll. 3–4; see Billig, 1995).
The reference to Yugoslavia’s disintegration (ll. 5–6) is significant here, as Luka
constructs the conflict and its consequences as being ‘done’ to citizens in a deliberate act
tomake them ‘indifferent’ to their future (ll. 7–9). Noteworthy is the removal of agency in
discussing the conflict, again using discontinuity arguments to position the in-group as a
victim of political changes imposed on them. In this extract, as in the previous one,we see
the two dimensions of PCC interact in discussions on socio-political change, where
ruptures to historical continuity are seen as endangering the preservation of features of
perceived cultural continuity (e.g., national symbols, traditions, and values; Sani et al.,
2007), threatening the survival of the in-group in the future (ll. 7–9).
In this section,we have shownhowarguments of historical continuity or discontinuity
can hold either positive or negative consequences for national identity. Appeals to
continuity become vital as they afford groups legitimacy and power to be in control of
their own politics, safeguarding the groupwhen disruptions to the narrative continuity of
historymeans it endangers claims to essentialism and come to threaten the entitativity of a
group (i.e., ‘national consciousness is endangered’; ‘loss of identity’; Chandler, 2000).
Claims to continuity becomedesirable, yet in changing circumstances these becomemore
difficult to sustain. As such, historical discontinuities can serve a desirable function, by
allowing participants to protect themselves against the negative implications of ruptures
(i.e., stigma of lack of progress, Extract 2), and side-step responsibility for negative events
(i.e., Yugoslav wars, Extract 3; Table 2, Quote 2). Arguments of discontinuity function to
defend a threatened national identity by positioning negative changes and ruptures as
done to us by others and not ‘our’ fault or responsibility.
In the next section, we illustrate how intergroup relations of the past become used to
either legitimize or delegitimize socio-political changes for the future, where continuity and
discontinuity arguments serve different functions and with different temporal orientations.
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Continuity and intergroup relations: How the past legitimizes and delegitimizes change
for the future
In line with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), group identities are deeply
influenced by both social and historical contexts including beliefs about the character-
istics of relevant intergroup relationships (Warner et al., 2016). Thus, EU integration
was not seen as just an economic and political transformation, but also a social
psychological one, requiring a re-evaluation of existing international relations. A key
‘other’ in this context was Russia and discussions often moved towards detangling
what kind of relationship Serbia had with Russia, and whether EU integration
threatened continuity to this and the meaning it held for Serbian identity. A common
approach for tackling this tension was to draw on strategies of dismantling, which
allowed participants to challenge the idea that Serbia–Russia relations had been
positive across history:
Extract 4. Belgrade (2)
1 Jelena: I think that Russia is our biggest fake friend, the biggest fake friend
2 we’ve had throughout centuries,
3 that’s a big blunder thatwe should be pro-Russia and that they always protect us,
4 that they’re always with us and that we should look up to them [. . .]
5 Marko: But you lose your roots. The EU destroyed your country.
6 Germany destroyed it, which was first to support the war. Germany destroyed
SFRJ.3
7 it supported that.
8 That makes her your true friend? [. . .] But how can you forget just like that,
9 that someone who was beating you, is today your friend? And you’re running
around
10 trying to grab onto him. . . If someone hurt you once, you can expect him to hurt
you
11 again.
Wodak et al. (2009) argue that in discussions of national identity, participants tend to
use the self-inclusive ‘we’ when making claims, but revert to an ‘I’ position when making
potentially taboo points. Jelena’s use of ‘I’ to deconstruct a positive temporally enduring
(‘always’, ll. 4) relationship between Serbia and Russia, and the assumption that this is a
normative position (‘should’, ll. 3–4), shows her awareness that this stands in
contradiction to the official narrative of history. In response to Jelenas’ deconstruction
of the significance of Russia through Serbian history, Marko responds with appeals to
continuity to persuade Jelena of the consequences of rejecting Russia for Serbian identity
(ll. 5–11). His construction of the EU, and in particular Germany, as key actors responsible
for the dissolution of Yugoslavia silences the in-group’s own accountability and instead
positions Serbia as a victim of past events (l. 9). The choice to mention SFRJ here is
significant primarily because of the function it serves in constructing what it means to be
Serbian in the present. For Marko, ‘real’ Serbs are those who do not forget history (ll. 5–
11), and his use of ‘you’ to refer to Jelenas’ point of view on history (ll. 5, 8–9) positions it
as outside of ‘our’ discourse on history, and thus not part of how ‘we’ see the past (see also
Obradovic, 2016). Instead, ‘our’ history positions the EU as a threat and use of historical
3 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
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continuity to strategically perpetuate the legitimacy of this threat supports previous
findings on the defensive function of historical narratives and their relationship to PCC
(Smeekes et al., 2017). This was common across groups:
Extract 5. Vranje
1 Zoran: Youknowwhat, I’ve always been a believer in thewhole idea that history
2 repeats itself. And if you go through history, Russia never hindered you.
3 Even if they didn’t help you, they sure enough didn’t hinder you.
4 While Germany, the US, England, France, they didn’t spare any ammunition,
5 if you see what I mean.
6 (General agreement).
7 They screwed you over at least once or twice in life.
Above, we see how participants use historical intergroup experiences to construct
arguments around historical continuity that justify present-day intergroup relations and in
turn delegitimize political change. Zoran’s claims presume that past intergroup
relationships will be predictive of future intergroup interactions via claims to historical
continuity, extending PCC judgments to outgroups as well (Warner et al., 2016). This is
accomplished through drawing on comparison between different outgroups (ll. 3–4) and
using history as a teacher for decoding the present (ll. 1–2). By using strategies of
justification, participants are able to argue that Russia is closer to the in-group than the
west because historically it has allowed Serbia to be in control of its own fate and future (ll.
2–3). The general agreement within the group indicates an in-group consensus. There is
no need to provide an elaboration of specific events to support the claim, but rather it is
accepted as a general pattern ‘through history’.
In both extracts, above we see the use of micro-linguistic tools that bring the nation’s
history to life, making it relevant to the present (Extract 4; ll. 5–11; Extract 5: ll.5, 8–11).
The anchoring of the nation in metaphors of the body situates the consequences of
national history within the lived experiences of contemporary citizens, emphasizing the
extended temporality inherent in how we experience our identities (Condor, 1996).
Continuity arguments are used to justify anti-EU arguments, yet in other discussions,
strategies of dismantling were used to challenge claims to positive historical relations
between Serbia–Russia, where continuity was perceived as problematic, both in the eyes
of the in-group and the outgroup (see also Table 2, Quote 1 and 2):
Extract 6. Belgrade (1)
1 Suzana: Can I go first? I think that Serbia absolutely isn’t pro-Russian,
2 I think that the influence of Russia is blown out of proportion and that that is a
fear
3 of the West, that Serbia will, now I’m not saying we’re innocent, we’re on the
4 fence, we want to [join the EU], but we don’t want to [join], and the Russians
aren’t
5 idiots, even they’re tired of us. And then we’re acting like we don’t want to join
6 either but in realitywe aremore inclined towards the EU, andwe endup looking
7 like idiots in the eyes of both. Yes, Serbia historically has closer ties with Russia
8 than say Croatia has had, and I agree with the decision not to implement
sanctions
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9 against Russia [during the Crimean crisis] but that’s not valued where you’re
10 trying to go. [. . .]
Suzana deconstructs the enduring image of positive Serbia–Russia relations as
exaggerated (ll. 1–2; see also Table 2, Quote 4) and perpetuated by outgroups (l. 3). She
voices the stigmatizing implications that continuity to balancing has for the in-group
(‘looking like idiots’; ll.5–7), andwhile she acknowledges the generally positive historical
relations between Serbia and Russia, she challenges the significance of these for the future
goals of the nation (ll. 8–10).Here, appeals for historical discontinuity are seen as desirable
for the in-group, in moving away from a stigmatizing identity and towards a future that is
defined by the decisions of Serbia, rather than other nations.
The present section has shown how intergroup relations are drawn on to strategically
legitimize or delegitimize politics in the present, by either focusing on continuitywith the
past or the potential benefits of discontinuity in the future. Arguments of historical
continuity extend not only to the characters of the in-group, but also to the characters of
the outgroups, where attitudes towards outgroups become shaped by shared intergroup
histories (Warner et al., 2016). These become challenged by arguments for historical
discontinuity that are used to dismantle narratives of positive historical intergroup
relations, which function to challenge the extent to which political change is threatening
to national identity, instead constructing the possibility of discontinuity as opening up
opportunities for progress in the future.
Discussion
Howdo social groupsmanage the paradox of samenesswithin change? Through analysing
the discursive management of national identity in nine focus groups in contemporary
Serbia, we have sought to extend our understanding of PCC beyond a perceptual and
cognitive phenomenon (e.g., Sani et al., 2007). We have done so by acknowledging and
examining the socially negotiated nature of collective continuity (Reicher, 2008), and
recognizing the potential limits of continuity (e.g., Warner et al., 2016) and the
possibilities that discontinuity arguments offer for the discursive construction of a
desirable national identity.
Serbia, with a national identity defined by its in-betweenness and balancing of
‘opposing’ ideological and cultural systems (Ristic, 2007; Russell-Omaljev, 2016), offers a
unique context within which to examine how the tensions between continuity and
discontinuity become embedded within broader discussions of the nation’s relationship
with relevant outgroups across its history.
Our analysis shows that both collective continuity and discontinuity are used as
rhetorical devices in discourses on socio-political change and have implications for
national identity in Serbia. Across both sections of the analysis, collective continuity is
predominantly portrayed as valuable; it affords groups the legitimacy to be subjects of
history with power to act independently (Extracts 1 and 2), it offers stability to an in-
groups values and systems (Extracts 3 and 4) and it legitimizes the core ‘essence’ of the in-
group (i.e., ‘national consciousness’, Extract 2; ‘identity’, Extract 3; ‘roots’, Extract 4)
whichmakes its identity unique. The value of these key national group characteristics that
PCC is theorized to involve (Haslam et al., 2000; Sani et al., 2007) was evident not only in
how the in-group was constructed, but also in its comparison with other nations with
more historical continuity (i.e., England, Extract 2), who were seen as able to progress
throughout history, uninterrupted by foreign actors.
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The data illustrate that intra-group negotiations around the role of continuity for
identity are inherently dialogical, where intergroup relations permeate not only how we
define our in-group, but also its history, and potential future. Arguments of historical
continuity allowhistory to serve as a teacher,making an uncertain present legible through
the lens of the past. In the case of Serbia, the EU is seen as implementing changes from the
outside, making it difficult for participants to construct political transformation as a
natural ‘choice’ for the in-group and thereby allowing them a sense of control over their
future. This is legitimized by continuity arguments where across history the EU never let
Serbia be ‘in control’ of its country (Extract 4 & 5). Unlike the EU, Russia let Serbia be a
subject of its own history, making it a better ‘ally’ to Serbia in the present. However, these
constructive processes depend on selective remembering and forgetting, thus becoming
open to contestation, as past wrongs and behaviours (such as those discussed in Quote 4,
Table 2) can be called upon to question how shared intergroup histories are remembered
(i.e., Extract 6).
The extant literature on PCC has provided evidence suggesting that drawing upon
collective identity continuity can act as a buffer in times of identity threat brought on by
proposed change (Jetten & Hutchinson, 2011; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015). Smeekes
et al. (2017) show that under conditions of heightened threat, group members tend to
endorse in-group narratives on past intergroup conflicts and that these increase feelings of
collective continuity. Within our data, we also find evidence of how historical narratives
are used to make continuity-based claims within citizens’ own accounts of group history
and how these function to further arguments for or against a projected group future. Yet,
there were also instances where collective continuity was seen as problematic. This was
particularly the case when it entailed continuity to potentially negative elements of a
nation’s identity, embodied in discussions around balancing between east and west, and
not being able to find a unitedway forward (i.e., Extract 6; Table 2, Quotes 1 and 2). Thus,
our analysis also offers another opportunity to extend the PCC literature by exploring the
role and function of narratives of discontinuity. The value afforded to national identity
continuity, and the ability to negotiate this depended not only on the strategic use of
continuity arguments, but also on discontinuity arguments.
The data revealed two types of discontinuity arguments. First, arguments of historical
discontinuities serve the function of allowing individuals to acknowledge negative
historical events and transformations between the past and the present, without taking
responsibility for these on a group level or internalizing the stigma theymight hold for the
national identity. These construct the nation as an object of history, where discontinuities
were ‘done to us’ by others (i.e., ‘Ottoman occupation’ and ‘EUmanipulation’; Extracts 2
and 3). Second, and distinct from the first, are arguments for historical discontinuity:
These emphasize the desire for change in the present due to an acknowledgement of
changed political or social circumstances (i.e., Extract 6; Table 2,Quote 3) and a desire for
a move towards a more progressive future. These discontinuity strategies functioned to
dismantle official narratives of history by bringing to light the complexities of shared
intergroup histories, in attempts at justifying political change as a way to break away from
a past marked by in-betweenness (Extracts 4 and 6). By arguing for historical
discontinuity, participants supported EU integration as a move from a powerless past
defined by the actions of others, and an opportunity to make progress in the future (i.e.,
Table 2, Quote 1).
The arguments made by the citizens of the nation under analysis paint a complex
picture of the role of collective continuity for in-group identity, by supporting the
experimental evidence showing that the valence associated with continuity is crucial
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in determining whether it is perceived as positive or negative (Roth et al., 2017). We
extend this work by arguing that valence is not shaped in isolation from relevant
others, but rather in dialogue with them. By using focus group data, we show how
participants wrestle with contrasting views of group history and their implications
for the present. While our data support previous conceptualizations of PCC as a
positive feature of national in-groups (e.g., Sani et al., 2007), we extend this by
illustrating the socially negotiated nature of continuity and its function for the
discursive construction of a desirable national identity. In doing so, we show that
the desirability of perceived continuity for national identity depends on how the
social category is defined by both the in-group itself, and how continuity is
perceived to give meaning to intergroup relations. Without the constraints of
relevant others and our perceptions of them, we would not have representations of
the past that were stigmatizing, nor experience our identities as such. Yet, it is
precisely because intergroup relations are intertwined that these dynamics exist and
become consequential for intra-group processes (i.e., Figueiredo et al., 2017). Thus,
while the nation might be seen as less agentic and in control in the past (i.e., Topcu
& Hirst, 2019), it is the ability to claim control over the historical narrative and the
choices of action in the present that allow for a desirable national future to be
imagined.
By examining the active shaping of group history as a rhetorical and strategic tool
for supporting and mobilizing particular identity projects, we can conceptualize
collective continuity (and discontinuity) as a socially negotiated process that is
managed and used by in-group members for particular purposes. This offers an
appreciation of social identities as dynamic and embedded within both temporal and
intergroup relations contexts, allowing us to more fully grasp their complex nature
(Condor, 1996; Tajfel, 1974). The strategic use of arguments of historical continuity
and discontinuity allow citizens taken on the active role of entrepreneurs of identity
and history (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), constructing the nation as both a subject and
object of history. By doing so, they safeguard a desirable national identity from the
negative consequences of historical ruptures, and providing a template for how to
relate to and meet present socio-political challenges in the context of long-standing
intergroup relations.
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